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Digital signage network (DSN) is capable of delivering customized content to designated 
screens in a real-time or near real-time manner, which provides tremendous potential for 
building dynamic demand stimulation tools. However current DSN media buying process 
is mainly carried out through manually conducted negotiation between the DSN operator 
and the advertisers. This practice does not capitalize the unique technology advantage 
offered by the newly emerged advertising medium. We propose automated DSN media 
buying models which allow advertisers to customize their promotion schedules in a 
highly responsive manner. Specifically, we design a direct revelation mechanism and an 
iterative bidding model for DSN promotion scheduling. We show that the direct 
revelation mechanism computes optimal solutions. We evaluate the revenue performance 
of the iterative bidding model through a computational study. The implementation of the 
iterative bidding mechanism is also described.  
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Chapter 1                                        
Introduction and Motivation 
1.1 Background 
With the advances in digital display and high bandwidth network technologies, digital 
signage network (DSN) has emerged to be a highly competitive advertising medium 
which enables organizations to target audiences in a wide range of settings with an 
unprecedented level of customization and timeliness. During the past decade, advertising 
industry has seen a significant development in advertisement delivery technologies. 
Typical examples include Internet ads, mobile phone ads, and DSN. While Internet and 
mobile phone ads require customers’ personal devices as delivery media, DSN is seen as 
a promising public advertising channel for delivering ads to targeted group of customers. 
Companies, especially those in the retail and quick service restaurant (QSR) sectors, have 
realized the potential of DSN as a new medium for marketing and publicity. Some large 
retailers, chiefly Wal-Mart, have been very successful in their in-store DSNs (Hall, 
2010). According to a new market research report from Global Industry Analysts Inc., the 
global DSN market should reach approximately $14 billion by 2017 (Global Industry 
Analysts, 2011) .  
According to the definition of Wirespring Technologies, any kind of electronic device 
(usually Plasma or LCD display) which can display an advertisement or a message is 
called digital signage (An Introduction to Digital Signage, 2011). A digital signage 




these displays are usually controlled by a central computer. DSN enables companies to 
customize their advertisements in real time. This unique technological advantage could 
provide several benefits for advertisers in retail and QSR industries.  For example, (1) 
demographic information of targeted customers could be used to customize the 
advertisement for different times of the day; (2) DSN can be integrated to the inventory 
management system, which enables the dynamic adjustment of adverting dose to improve 
inventory management efficiency; (3) the effectiveness of advertisements can be assessed 
regularly through point-of-sale data and ineffective advertisements could be changed in a 
timely manner.  
In general, the digital signage industry is driven by three economic models, namely 
traditional digital signage, ad-funded digital signage, and ad-supported digital signage 
(Gurley, 2010). In a traditional digital signage deployment, the venue owner owns and 
runs the DSN. This is a model used by corporations, hotels, universities, hospitals, banks, 
etc. In an ad-funded digital signage deployment, a third party provides a digital signage 
system to a venue at little or no cost to the venue owner. The third party then seeks to 
recoup the initial capital outlay plus on-going operational expenses by selling ads to 
advertisers. An ad-supported system is a hybrid of the ad-funded and traditional models. 
In an ad-supported system, the venue owner purchases the system, but then works to sell 
advertising to either off-set the cost of the system or to make money from the system. For 
ad-funded and ad-supported DSNs, advertising is the most important source of revenue. It 
is common that the selling of ads is managed by third party network operators. Some 
operators can integrate networks across many venues into a large scale DSN which is 




digital signage network solution provider Premier Retail Network (PRN) manages DSNs 
from large retailers such as Wal-Mart, Target, and Costco.  PRN also manages DSNs 
from some of the most well-known QSR chains. These networks reside in over 5,700+ 
locations and deliver 181.1 million commercial viewers per month (PRN, 2012)  
1.2 Challenges and Motivation 
The responsiveness of advertising is crucial to many retail and QSR settings. Freshness is 
an important selling point for QSRs and the average shelf life of their items is short. 
Many QSRs have the policy of throwing unsold items away at the end of the day. In retail 
settings, managers are often under the pressure of selling perishable products before their 
expiration dates or emptying the shelves before a specific deadline to make room for new 
inventories. Traditional media such as weekly flyers, TV and radio cannot offer the 
needed responsiveness due to the long lead time required for content planning, producing 
and delivering. The establishment of the digital signage networks provides the 
infrastructure for building highly responsive advertising solutions. In the Vendor 
Managed Inventory (VMI) model, which has been adopted by major retailers around the 
world, vendors have access to up-to-date information regarding inventory levels of their 
products in the store. They strive to optimize the replenish schedule to reduce overall 
costs. When the actual demand fails to rise to the forecasted level or when vendors must 
push more products to the store to accommodate supply chain changes, in-store digital 
signage becomes an indispensable tool for boosting sales and keeping inventories at a 
desired level. 
Despite the proliferation of DSNs and their enormous capability of reaching and 




the unique technology advantages offered by the newly emerged digital medium. Unlike 
traditional broadcasting channels, DSN has the capability of delivering customized 
content to designated screens in a real-time or near real-time manner. This capability 
offers tremendous opportunities for building a dynamic demand stimulation tool which 
will considerably enhance retail and QSR supply chain efficiency. In current media 
buying practice, an advertiser and the DSN operator need to negotiate a contract well 
before a promotion campaign starts. Once the required promotion schedules and the 
associated payments are agreed upon, the advertiser’s content will be added to the 
network’s playlist and delivered to the screens according to the predefined schedules. 
This media buying process does not incorporate advertisers’ supply chain changes in a 
timely manner. As a result, the opportunities of utilizing digital signage for high 
responsive demand stimulation remain under-exploited.  In many cases, DSN media 
buying is also a First-Come-First-Served process, which does not optimize the allocation 
of screen time across advertisers. 
1.3 Approach and Scope  
In this thesis, we propose an automated digital signage advertising approach which 
optimizes advertisers’ promotion schedules in response to the changes of their supply 
chain conditions. Specifically, we design economic-based mechanisms to dynamically 
distribute screen time to independent in-store brands. We note that by offering an 
automated promotion scheduling tool, our approach allows advertisers to adjust their 
promotion schedules “on the fly” according to the updated inputs from the market and the 
supply chain. Ultimately, we believe that, in today’s increasingly virtual and volatile 




with vendors’ inventory control strategies will considerably reduce supply chain costs 
and improve operational efficiency. At system level, the proposed approach balances the 
promotion requirements across all advertisers and achieves system-wide optimality. 
In terms of the scope of this research, we focus on a typical VMI setting. In this type of 
environment, there can be hundreds of vendors competing with each other for the in-store 
advertising time. Vendors are assumed to be independent, profit-driven economic units, 
and they aim at optimizing their own objectives rather than the performance of the system 
as a whole. Therefore, digital signage promotion scheduling is a decentralized scheduling 
problem with self-interested agents (we model independent vendors as self-interested 
agents). This decentralized scheduling problem calls for economic-based models and 
techniques that take into account these agents’ strategic behaviors. In addition, the 
scheduling process must have the capacity to accommodate dynamic changes in the 
supply chain as well. We assume an ad-funded or ad-supported DSN system which is 
managed by a network operator who tries to assign screen times to promotion contents 
from advertisers, such that the values of all vendors are maximized. A DSN has the 
capability to contain screens located in several venues, but in this thesis, we restrict our 
scope to a store- level single venue environment. 
1.4 Outline of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews related literature 
including inventory management policies through advertising, various auction models, 
and auction-based promotion management approaches. Chapter 3 discuss factors that 
affect customer response to the advertisements, which forms the base of our formulation 




promotion scheduling problem. Chapter 5 describes the auction-based DSN promotion 
scheduling framework. Chapter 6 describes our system implementation and verifies the 
performance of the proposed approach through a computational study. Chapter 7 




Chapter 2                                       
Literature Review 
This chapter reviews literatures related to the proposed DSN promotion scheduling 
approach. Since the objective of the proposed approach is to effectively integrate 
advertising with inventory management, we first survey some existing inventory 
management policies that involve advertising. We then describe different auction models 
which form the theoretical base of our auction-based promotion scheduling approach. 
Finally, we review existing digital signage promotion scheduling approaches and position 
our approach in the literature. 
2.1 Inventory Control through Advertising 
An effective marketing strategy is a key in supply chain management. Stores usually use 
different advertising media to promote their products and also control their inventory. We 
review several commonly used media in this subsection.   
2.1.1 Flyer advertising  
Retailers put a high amount of intention towards flyer advertisement. Generally half of 
the promotion budget of most large supply chain retailers is spent on the flyers printing 
(Bodapati & Anand, 1999). The flyer’s success mostly depends on the volume of flyers, 
the printed site of the advertisement and the promotion of the flyers (Gijsbrechts, Campo, 
& Goossen, 2003). According to Gijsbrechts (2003), the type and size of discount and 




analyse the first page of the flyer and the rest of the flyer doesn’t get the same attention as 
the first page. Being static is another limitation of the flyers, particularly when the 
advertised are perishable products. Seasonal promotions are mostly used by franchise 
supply chains like Dominos, Tim Horton and Subway. They prepare flyers according to 
each season promotions and post them to their local customers. Also some large retail 
stores like Provigo and Costco prepare monthly or weekly flyers which help them to 
control their fresh product inventory. The efficiency of Flyers haven’t been studied that 
much although they are one of the key media in retail promotion. Flyers are usually 
successful when there is a huge price decrease on the advertised product.  
2.1.2 Narrowcasting  
An advertisement can be called a Narrowcast advertisement when customers are 
receiving the advertisements in a narrow range; a good example could be the shopping 
cart screens (Ghani, Cumby, Fano, & Krema, 2008). Individual customer shopping 
patterns can be built by these screens as they can forecast shopping lists through the 
combination of knowledge –based techniques with statistical and learning algorithms. 
With the help of the screens individual promotions was offered to the customers. Data 
mining was used in one of the suggested models to use historical data regarding customer 
purchases to build up an individual model for customer shopping behaviour prediction. 
Another feature provided by the narrowcasting screens is the shopping list which narrows 
downs the product list for the customer. Also individual promotions and discounts can be 
offered through these screens. However, for large retailers, they should connect all the 
screens with their central inventory management system in real time which bring a lot of 




2.1.3 E-grocery channels  
Now days grocery shopping can be done through internet with the help of ecommerce 
technologies, this way of shopping is called e-grocery. Some new channels were 
introduced for e-grocery in recent years, one of them is a handheld device designed for 
shoppers to enable them ordering products when they are out of store (Bellamy, et al., 
2001). This device had functioned like a smart phone; the store inventory was connected 
to the device and had enabled the customers to choose their desired goods through the 
device application. The connection was real time which was a great advantage of this 
device and through this real time connection the store could promote a product by 
messaging the customers. A limitation of the device is that it complicates user interface 
which was not suitable for older generations (Bellamy, et al., 2001). In E-grocery channel 
advertising, advertisements can also be sent to the screens of targeted customers through 
in-store wireless network (Arvind & Suresh, 2006). Factors like day, time slot, 
customer’s age and sex were considered in the advertisement scheduling process.  
2.1.4 Audio broadcasting  
Another new method that has seen lots of developments during the recent years is audio 
broadcasting. This method usually competes with flyer promotions to attract customers 
(Williams & Diane, 2005). The history of audio/radio advertisement goes back to 50 
years ago where retail stores had used it for advertising. In recent years, chain stores use 
separate radio stations for each of the stores, which enable them to target customers from 
different regions.  
Retail audio networks are another audio broadcasting method.  According to Arbitron’s 




affect their buying decisions (Williams & Diane, 2005). However with this method it is 
hard to allocate proper promotion schedules to play the ads because the store can only 
play a single ad at a time.     
2.2 Auctions 
Since we will propose an auction based DSN promotion scheduling method, we review 
some typical auction models in this subsection.  In recent years auction theory has been 
applied to the design of a number of real-world markets. In particular, a considerable 
body of research has been devoted to designing auctions for resource allocation and 
scheduling problems. Several classes of auctions usually appear in scheduling literature, 
including single item auctions, Generalized Vickrey Auction, iterative bundle auctions, 
sequential, and simultaneous auctions. We review them as follows.  
Single item auctions 
Single unit auctions refer to traditional auction mechanisms such as the English, Dutch, 
First (or Second) price Sealed-Bid auctions. These auction types are useful for settings 
where there is a single unit of an item being bought /sold at a time. Single item auctions 
are trivial in terms of computation. However, they are used extensively in the real world. 
They have also been used to construct computational markets, such as “thermal market” 
for distributing air more equitably in a building a through auction-based system 
(Huberman & Clearwater, 1995), marketed-based control to computer systems (Ferguson, 
Nickolaou, Sairamesh, & Yemini, 1995), and computational resource scheduling in grid 




among resources, their application to scheduling problems are limited. Sometimes, they 
can be used as components in sequential or simultaneous auctions described later. 
Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA)  
The GVA is a sealed bid auction. In theory, it can find efficient schedules for all 
decentralized scheduling problems, and it is incentive compatible. This GVA family of 
mechanisms has become the “Golden” standard in mechanism design. However, it 
requires each agent to evaluate all bundles of the items. Auctions directly implement 
GVA for G items quickly become informationally and computationally infeasible, with 
2G bundles to price and ( )GO G possible allocations. Therefore, GVA is likely to be 
practical for smaller problems. The computational complexities of GVA have been 
studied by various researchers (Fujishima, Yuzo, Leyton-Brown, & Shoham, 1999) 
(Rassenti, Stephen, Smith, & Bulfin, 1982) (Rothkopf, Michael, Aleksandar, & Harstad, 
1998) (Sandholm T. , 2002). Some sophisticated algorithms have produced promising 
results (Sandholm, Suri, Gilpin,, & Levine, 2005). However, scheduling problems often 
result in large set of goods to be sold in the market (due to time line Discretization), 
which lead to bigger size problems, and in turn, inflict heavy burdens in terms of 
computation. Another limitation with GVA is the so called “lying auctioneer” problem 
(Sandholm T., 1999) which partially explains why Vickery auction is not widely used in 
practice, even though it has been proposed since 1960’s.  
Iterative bundle auction 
GVA mechanism has also been implemented as iterative bundle auctions. Iterative bundle 




significance because it addresses the computational and informational complexity of 
GVA by allowing agents to reveal their preference information as necessary as the 
auction proceeds, and agents are not required to submit (and compute) complete and 
exact information about their private valuations. Typical examples of iterative bundle 
auction include (Parkes & Ungar, 2001) (Parkes & Kalagnanam, 2005). A comprehensive 
survey for combinatorial auctions can be found in (deVries & Vohra, 2003). 
The above mentioned combinatorial auctions are designed for general combinatorial 
allocation problems. Although they can be applied to scheduling problems, they do not 
explore the specific problems characteristics derived from the scheduling domain. There 
are few combinatorial auctions in the literature designed specifically for scheduling 
problems.  In (Kutanoglu E., Wu S. D., 1999), iterative auctions are applied to the job 
shop scheduling problem. The focus is to investigate the links between combinatorial 
auctions and Lagrangean relaxation, and to design auctions based on the Lagrangean 
based decomposition. A “schedule selection game” is presented in (Kutanoglu and Wu, 
2006) for collaborative production scheduling. The emphasis is on the incentive 
compatibility of the mechanism. In (Wellman, Walsh, Wurman, & MacKie-Mason, 
2001), the properties of several auction protocols are investigated in the context of 
decentralized scheduling. 
Sequential and simultaneous auctions  
Sequential and simultaneous auctions price bundles as the sum price of the individual 
items. Sequential auctions suppose that the set of resources of interest are auctioned in 
sequence. Agents bid for resources in a specific, known order, and can choose how much 




on. Sequential auctions are particularly useful in situations where setting up a 
combinatorial or simultaneous auctions are infeasible. Typical approaches using 
sequential auctions for resource allocation include (Boutilier, Dean, & Hanks, 
1999)(Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber, 1983).  
Simultaneous auctions sell multiple goods in separate markets simultaneously. Agents 
have to interact with simultaneous but distinct markets in order to obtain a combination 
of resources sufficient to accomplish their task. Real-world markets quite typically 
operate separately and concurrently despite significant interactions in preferences. A 
typical example is the series of FCC spectrum auctions (McAfee & McMillan, 1996). In 
(Reeves, Wellman, MacKie-Mason, & Osepayshvili, 2005) (Wellman, Walsh, Wurman, 
& MacKie-Mason, 2001), price prediction and bidding strategies for simultaneous 
auctions are studied in the setting of market-based scheduling. In (Parkes & Ungar, 2001) 
simultaneous auctions are designed for decentralized train scheduling problems. A review 
of the uses of economic theory in simultaneous auction design can be found in (Milgrom, 
1999). 
Sequential and simultaneous auctions tackle the complementarities over resources in the 
same spirit of general equilibrium theory. These auctions fail when there are no prices 
that support an efficient solution (the existence problem) and also when agents bid 
cautiously to avoid purchasing an incomplete bundle (the exposure problem). However, 
given that these auctions are more practical in terms of computation, they are two 




2.3 Digital Signage Promotion and Auction-Based Scheduling Approaches 
The scheduling approach that we aim to use in this thesis is the dynamic near real-time 
promotion scheduling which allows multilateral negotiation between advertisers and the 
digital signage operator. The previous study that is mostly relevant to our work is a 
virtual marketplace for advertising narrowcast over DSN (Harrison & Andrusiewicz, 
2004) , In their paper, the authors introduce a partially automated intermediary, namely 
the Digital Signage Exchange, which enables the formation of a virtual marketplace for 
display time on the DSN and facilitates collaboration between buyers and the DSN. The 
focus is on the concise representation of customer’s order and bilateral negotiation 
between the DSN and a customer.  Different from their view, our emphasis is on the 
system-wide performance in terms of the values across all vendors. Furthermore, our 
approach achieves good performance in both competitive market and game theoretic 
settings.  In our models, we also use economic models and pricing strategies which allow 
multilateral negotiation between vendors and the operator.   
There are some other approaches in the market. One of them is the mechanism that 
selects the best ad in response to user requirement (Payne, David, Jennings, & Sharifi, 
2006). This approach assumes that the identities of the customers can be discovered 
through their Bluetooth enabled devices and their historic purchase behaviour data can be 
retrieved. Auctions can be used to select the appropriate ads which would improve the 
advertising effectiveness. Another similar approach is to use screens on shopping carts 
for advertisement based on each customer’s historic shopping pattern (Ghani, Cumby, 
Fano, & Krema, 2008). This method requires the use of individual consumer data, 




There are several other auction based scheduling approaches like runway landing 
timeslots scheduling in airport (Rassenti, Stephen, Vernon, & Bulfin, 1982), machine 
processing time scheduling (Wellman, Walsh, Wurman, & MacKie-Mason, 2001) 
,computation resources and network accessing time scheduling (Buyya, 2002),and 
scheduling of railroad tracks (Parkes & Ungar, 2001). In (Kutangolu and Wu, 1999), 
iterative auctions are applied to the job shop scheduling problem. The focus is to 
investigate the links between combinatorial auctions and Lagrangean relaxation, and to 
design auctions based on the Lagrangean based decomposition. A “schedule selection 
game” is presented in another paper from the same authors (Kutanoglu & Wu, 2006) , for 
collaborative production scheduling. The emphasis of the schedule selection game is on 
the incentive compatibility of the mechanism. At supply chain level, auction-based 
scheduling framework is applied to the due date management problem (Wang, Wang, 
Ghenniwa, & Shen, 2011) , the decisions of job selection, due date quotation, and pricing 
are made concurrently in this paper. Differently from the above mentioned auction-based 
scheduling applications, the proposed auction framework in this thesis is an iterative 
multiple homogeneous object auction which is specially designed for the domain of DSN 
promotion scheduling. The vendors’ preferences are modeled based on an advertising 
response function proposed in the marketing research literature.  
In addition to auctions, agent-based models are also applied to scheduling problems. 
These models are mainly found in agent-based manufacturing control literature (Xue, 
Sun, & Norrie, 2001) (Cavalieri, Garetti, Macchi, & Taisch, 2000). References and 
reviews of this line of research can be found in (Shen W., 2002) and (Shen, Wang, & 




1980) and its variants have been commonly used in agent-based scheduling as a class of 
distributed decision making protocols. Differently from our game theoretic assumption, 
most of the agent-based manufacturing scheduling systems assume cooperative 




Chapter 3 Advertising Response 
Assessment  
How customer response to advertisements has been an important question in marketing 
research. In his experiential generalization of advertisement effectiveness (Clarke D. , 
1976), Clarke observed that 90% influence of advertising on sales happened during the 
advertisement period, which indicates that on site advertising, such as DSN, can be 
effective. Jones (2006) also confirmed that, to have the highest impact, the 
advertisements should appear immediately before the purchase, which can be naturally 
achieved through DSN (Jones J. P., 2006). To assess the benefits of DSN, it is important 
to know how customers response to the advertisements delivered by DSN. In this chapter, 
we first describe the impact of technologies on different categories of customers. We then 
discuss factors that affect customer response in the DSN environment. We also provide 
an advertising response function which formally captures the relationship between the 
discussed advertising factors and sale uplifts.  
3.1 The Impact of Technologies 
In recent years there have been many new technological innovations inside the stores, 
such as digital signage, wireless devices and smart cards. These technologies have 
improved the shopping experience of customers and facilitated the purchasing process. 
Burke (2009) summarized the impact of technologies on different categories of customers 
(Burke & Raymond, 2009). In general, customers under 25 were more interested in 




auctions. This group is also positive on factors that could increase the chance of finding a 
bargain like variable pricing policy. On the other hand, older consumers emphasize more 
on detailed product information and quality of service. They like more specific details of 
each product in large dimensions but they don’t show high interest for interactive 
technologies. In terms of gender, male consumers show higher interest in using various 
types of technology through the shopping process whereas female costumers prefer 
printed documents for product information. Education also plays an important role in 
different consumer’s decisions on technologies. For example, consumers with higher 
level of education are more comfortable with non-store channels such as internet whereas 
less educated consumers prefer receiving all the products directly from the retail store.  In 
the following section, we discuss customer response to a particular technology DSN. 
However, we only consider a general category. We don’t distinguish customers based on 
their age, gender and levels of education. 
3.2 Customer Response in the DSN Environment  
In addition to general advertising factors that apply to all channels, as an onsite delivery 
channel, DSN has some unique factors, such as screen location and promotion time. In 
this section, we discuss five major factors that affect customer response to the 
advertisement in the DSN environment, namely product category, promotion dose, 
content attractiveness, display location, and promotion time. Among them the first three 




3.2.1 Product category  
The first factor being put in focus is product category. It is commonly understood that 
customers have different sensitivity to the advertisements of different types of products. 
Burke (2009) conducted a case study regarding the advertising sensitivity of different 
categories of products (Burke & Raymond, 2009). The study used the data from Tesco 
which is a chain retail store in UK. The data has been collected from 102 different 
advertising campaigns in 100 stores during the years between 2005 and 2007. Each store 
had at least 40 screens installed inside various zones of the store. Screens are used to 
show advertisements related to the product in each zone. The study shows that, given 
similar amount of advertisement for each category of products, different product 
categories show quite different advertising sensitivity. The following table taken from 
Burke (2009) gives detailed comparison of advertising sensitivity of product categories.   
Product Category  Average Sales Uplift 
Alcoholic Drinks 12.9% 




Grocery  7.1% 
Household 3.2% 
Health & Beauty  0.7% 





As it can be seen in the table, food and entertainment products are more sensitive to 
advertisement whereas household and beauty products are less responsive to advertising. 
3.2.2 Promotion dose  
In his influential study, Jones investigated customer response to advertisements based on 
a brand’s market share measured in purchasing occasions and not purchasing volumes 
(Jones J. P., 2006). He named this research system short-term advertising strength 
(STAS) which concludes three factors: 
• Baseline STAS: Brand’s market share in households with no prior advertisement. 
• Simulated STAS: Brand’s market share in households with prior advertisement. 
• STAS Differential: This results from the difference between Baseline STAS and 
Simulated STAS; it is the measure of short term gain or loss. 
Jones study shows that advertisement mostly doesn’t influence the decision or need to 
buy a product but it can influence the choice of a brand, this is done by reminding the 
brand through continuous advertisement and also focusing the ads on prior brand 
experience. The study also indicates that as advertising exposure doses increase so do 
sales but at a diminishing rate from the beginning. 
3.2.3 Attractiveness of the advertisement 
Attractiveness, or the quality of the advertisement design, is also an important general 
factor that impacts customer response. In order to make an advertisement attractive, the 
demographic issues (race, income, age and etc.) of the targeted customers should be taken 
in to consideration (Harrison & Andrusiewicz, 2003). Harrison and Andrusiewicz (2003) 




illustrate this idea. The perceived quality and attractiveness of an advertisement changes 
according to the targeted customers, for example showing a snow covered mountain 
won’t attract Miami Latin American people as they cannot relate them self to that kind of 
environment, but the same image could attract the people of Lake Tahoe as it is related to 
their demographics. In addition, the choice of the appropriate audio can also impact 
quality. The Ricky Martin song is a better solution for the people of Miami. However it 
could be the worst solution for people of Lake Tahoe as they would prefer country style 
music.   
3.2.4 Promotion time 
At which time the advertising media should be played is another factor that should be 
considered in DSN. Ideally, the media should be played when customer traffic is high and 
when customers are more interested in watching the media. To understand the impact of 
promotion time on the effectiveness of advertising, Video Mining Corp conducted a 
study by placing a finger touch digital signage showing paint products positioned in the 
main corridor of a shopping mall (Burke & Raymond, 2009). A video tracking system 
was used to record the number of shoppers who interacted with the display. The test 
lasted 3 months and around 100,000 customers were recorded during the testing period. 
The following table shows the result. 
Time  Customer Traffic  Customer Interaction 
Morning  20.2% 9.6 % 
Afternoon  46.4% 12% 
Evening  33.3% 14.6% 





It is clear from the result that advertisements played in the afternoons and evenings attract 
more customer attention. Another study shows that customers are more task-oriented 
earlier on the weekdays and become more interested in browsing later in weekdays 
(afternoon and evening) and in weekends (Burke & Raymond, 2009). The same pattern is 
also confirmed by Jones (2006). 
3.2.5 Promotion location 
In addition to time, location is also an important factor that affects DSN advertising 
effectiveness.  Screens placed in high traffic area certainly attract more customer 
attention. The following table summarizes the results of a location related customer 
traffic study conducted by Nielsen Media Research in 2007 (Gutierrez B. P., 2008). 
During a one week time window, 1,155,489 customers who entered the shop were 
tracked and the locations they visited were recorded.   
The result shows that lobby zone has the highest customer traffic with 100% customer 
traffic. The result also shows that food and impulse products attract a higher amount of 










Store Location  Average Amount of Audience  
Lobby Zone  100% 
Runway –Rear Wall 76% 
Runway – Front Wall 64% 
Product Zone  62% 
Dairy Zone  59% 
Meat & poultry zone  45% 
Runway-Perimeter 42% 
Frozen Food Zone  33% 
Bakery Zone  24% 
Pharmacy Zone 9% 
Table 3-3: Location and audience amount 
 
3.3 DSN Advertising Response Function 
To formally describe the relationship between the above mentioned factors and the 
adverting effectiveness, in this section, we define a function which is a mapping from the 
factors in a promotion schedule to the sales uplift that the schedule generates. The 
function is usually called the response function of adverting in marketing research (Jones 
J. P., 2006). The general response functions in the literature only capture the three general 
factors: product category, dose, and advertisement quality. We first describe the general 
response function proposed in the literature. We then specify our DSN response function 




While the general response function is usually assumed to be either S-shaped or 
concave in the literature (Khouja & Robbins, 2003), many researchers support the 
concave response function presented by Jones (Jones J. P., 2006).  This function indicates 
that as exposure doses increase so do sales but at a diminishing rate from the beginning. 
Assume that 	 is a random variable representing the demand of vendor ’s product.  
Because of diminishing returns of advertising, the expected value of 	 is a concave 
increasing function in the exposure dose of , which we assume to be given by 
  	
 =  +                        
where  is the average demand without advertising;	0 ≤  ≤ 1and  indicates the  
sensitivity of the product to advertising, which can be affected by factors such as the 
category of the product and seasonality;  determines the shape of the diminishing 
function, which is mainly related to the quality of content . For any  > 0, the larger the 
value of , the more effective is the advertising. A similar response function with 
advertising expenditure as input is also proposed in (Khouja & Robbins, 2003). 
In the DSN environment, special factors, such as promotion time and location should 
also be considered when assessing the effectiveness of a promotion schedule. Given a 
promotion schedule that contains multiple promotion time periods and locations, 
constructing an accurate response function can be challenging. In this thesis, we assume 
that the impact of time and location can be converted to the impact to the dose. We add 
two impact factors,   for location and  for starting time, to model the impact of 
location and time to the promotion schedules effectiveness, where 0 ≤  ≤ 1, 0 ≤  ≤
1, and    is the dose at best location and best time. Including these two factors, the DSN 





 =  +                    
Given a product to be promoted and the media content, , , and 	are constants which 
can be determined by historical data. In modern DSNs, the vast amount of real time 
point-of-sale data has been integrated into the digital signage management systems 
(Yackey, 2010). For an advertisement that has been running for a certain periods of time, 
it is reasonable to assume that the constants can be determined with good accuracy.  In 
addition, the  and  can also be predicted by using the existing studies, such as Burke 
(2009) and historical data.  
It is important to note that the response function developed here is a general template 
and may not reflect the unique characteristics of a DSN environment. To apply it to a 
specific DSN setting, the parameters and even the function structure need to be adjusted. 
In fact, we have already considered developing sales response models which take into 
consideration much more factors in our future research. In addition, in our promotion 
scheduling framework design, the response function is a module that is used to predict 
expected sales uplift given the content’s exposure dose. Should more suitable models are 
developed for a DSN, the response function can always be replaced without altering other 
modules of the scheduling framework. Using the advertising response function, a vendor 
can predict the expected sales generated by the exposure dose of  time units provided by 





Chapter 4                                                  
The DSN Promotion Scheduling 
Problem 
In this section, we define the DSN promotion scheduling problem. We assume an ad-
funded or ad-supported setting where the DSN is managed by a network operator who 
allocates screen time to promotion contents from advertisers. While a DSN can contain 
screens located in multiple venues, to simplify the modeling, we restrict our attention to a 
store-level single venue environment.    
 




4.1 The Single Venue DSN Promotion Scheduling Environment 
The DSN promotion scheduling environment consists of a DSN, an operator, and a 
group of advertisers (we call them vendors in the rest of the thesis1).  As shown in Figure 
4-1, all screens in the DSN are located in a store. These screens are connected to the 
operator’s promotion management system through a high speed network.  They are also 
intelligent screens meaning that they are controlled by embedded computers which can 
store the promotion contents streamed to them and play the contents based on the 
predefined promotion schedule.  
Vendors are also connected to the promotion management system through the Internet. 
A vendor has access to real time information regarding the inventory levels and sales data 
of their products in the store. This is particular the case in VMI (Vendor Managed 
Inventory) (Waller, Johnson, & Davis, 1999) which has been widely adopted by large 
retailers. In VMI, vendors, rather than retailers, are responsible for monitoring the 
inventory levels of their products and replenish the inventory as needed. They strive to 
optimize the replenish schedule to reduce overall costs. When the actual demand fails to 
rise to the forecasted level or when vendors must push more products to the store to 
accommodate supply chain changes, they have a strong incentive to use highly 
                                                 
 
1 In the case of the DSNs owned by large retailers, screen time is typically sold to companies that 
do business with them (e.g. product suppliers) and both the retailer and advertiser benefit from 
the success of the ads. Without loss of generality, we assume that advertisers are product 
suppliers in this thesis. We call them vendors, which is consistent with the terminology used in 




responsive demand stimulation tools, such as DSN, for boosting sales and keeping 
inventories at a desired level. Suppose that the store’s opening hours of a day are divided 
into several promotion windows, within which the operator schedules media contents 
from vendors. The scheduling process is run window by window, that is, for a particular 
promotion window, the customization process has to be run within the window before it. 
In this way, vendors have the opportunity to update their promotion requirements for a 
window before it starts to accommodate dynamic changes in their respective supply 
chains. The width of a window can be adjusted based on responsiveness requirements of 
vendors. 
4.2 Formulation of the DSN Promotion Scheduling Problem  
The task of the promotion scheduling is to allocate limited screen time to the content 
of vendors such that the operator’s business objective can be achieved. In this thesis, we 
define the network operator’s business objective as to maximize the overall benefits that 
vendors receive. In microeconomic terms, this is to maximize the social welfare (Mas-
Colell, Whinston, & R., 1995) of all vendors. The objective of maximizing social welfare 
is commonly used in the microeconomics and mechanism design literature as a criterion 
for measuring resource allocation efficiency. It is suitable for the settings such as VMI 
where vendors have repeated transactions and long term relationship with the operator. 
To quantify the business objective, we introduce a definition called the promotion value 
of a schedule which is defined as the measure of the benefits that a vendor receives from 
the sales uplift generated by a promotion schedule. These benefits can be, for example, 




4.3 Promotion Value 
The advertisement response function in Section 3.3 provides the sales uplift based on a 
specific dose of advertisement. Given the sales uplift generated by a schedule, we assume 
that a vendor always has a mechanism to assign a promotion value to it. This value is the 
price that the advertiser is willing to pay given its supply chain situations, such as 
inventory levels and scheduled transportation, delivery and promotion. This mechanism 
is usually vendor dependent and may involve experts’ subjective judgments. We do not 
identify the specific forms of the mechanism in this thesis. In general this mechanism 
should take vendor’s current supply chain circumstances, such as holding costs, product 
expiration date, and demand forecasts into consideration. 
4.4 Problem formulation 
Consider a simplified store level DSN promotion allocation problem with a set of  
vendors, denoted , who want to promote their products on a set of  digital screens. 
Given a promotion window which consists of  time units (for example,  minutes or 
seconds), the operator wishes to allocate the  time units to vendors to maximize the 
sum of promotion values across all vendors. The time dimension is not an issue in our 
simplified model and we just deal with the allocation problem but this can be considered 
in future work. An allocation is called a promotion schedule which can be represented by 
a coverage vector  = , … , "	, where ,  1 ≤  ≤ , is the number of time units 
assigned to vendor .  Let # denote the promotion value of vendor  for advertising 
within a number of  time units. The promotion scheduling problem (PSP) can be 
expressed using the following integer programming model. 





∑  ≤"&  ,   (2)  
 ∈ 	0,1,2, … , )
,	  1 ≤  ≤  ,   (3)    
where ) is the maximum number of time units that vendor  can purchase, called 
vendor limit. The purpose of setting ) is to prevent a single or small group of vendors 
from dominating the screens. ) is set by the operator. The set of constraints (2) 
ensures that the overall time units allocated to vendors do not exceed the available time 
units. Constraints (3) ensure that the number of time units obtained by any vendor is an 
integer and also restricted by their upper limit. The constraints of the model are linear. 
However, the objective function is not linear since the promotion value functions # 






Chapter 5                                                
The DSN Promotion Scheduling 
Framework 
DSN promotion scheduling is a decision making process which allocates screen time to 
vendors based on their advertising demands. The allocation can be naturally implemented 
using a market mechanism in which the operator is the seller, the brand advertisers are 
buyers, and the screen time units are items to be sold in the market. In a typical DSN 
environment, vendors are independent, profit-driven economic units. They may have 
conflicting and competing promotion schedule requirements. They also possess private 
information relevant to their needs (such as the promotion value they place on a particular 
schedule). Vendors could be direct or potential competitors. They are reluctant to reveal 
their sensitive supply chain information. To recognize this independence, we treat them 
as self-interested agents that aim at optimizing their own objectives rather than the 
performance of the system as a whole. Designing a DSN scheduling framework for self-
interested vendors calls for mechanism design techniques that take into account the 
vendors’ strategic behaviors. We design DSN scheduling models for the game theoretic 
settings in which vendors will behave strategically to optimize their objectives. We first 
present a direct revelation mechanism (DRM) (Mas-Colell, Whinston, & R., 1995) for 
promotion scheduling. In the DRM model, vendors are only given one opportunity to 




designing an iterative procedure which allows vendors to gradually submit their valuation 
on a need to reveal basis.   
 
5.1 The DRM Model  
The DRM model is an interactive procedure between the vendors and the operator, 
which allows vendors only one opportunity to submit their promotion valuation. We first 
describe the overall procedure. We then propose algorithms for computing vendors’ 
coverage vector and payments. 
5.1.1 The procedure 
The procedure contains the following steps:  
Step 0: Initialization. Each vendor computes # for 1 ≤  ≤ ) using the response 
function and vendor specific mechanism for computing promotion values.  
Step 1: Submission. All vendors submit their complete promotion valuation to the 
operator. For vendor , the complete valuation can be represented by a vector of 
size ), each element of the vector storing the promotion value of a specific 
dose. Instead of submitting a promotion value vector, vendor  can of course 
submit their response function and promotion value estimation mechanism, so 
the operator can calculate the vendor’s promotion value for any exposure dose. 
However, submitting the response function and promotion value estimation 
mechanism exposes more private information. Therefore, vendors may be 
reluctant to do that. In addition, value estimation mechanisms are vendor 




and transferred to the operator. In our DSN scheduling framework, we assume 
that vendors submit their promotion value vectors.  
Step 2: Computing coverage vector and payments. Taking all vendors’ promotion 
value vectors as input, the operator computes customized doses for each vendor 
by solving the PSP model. An algorithm for computing the PSP model is 
described in the next subsection.  
Step 3: Notification and deployment. The operator notifies vendors the awarded 
coverage vectors. After the notifications are confirmed by the vendors, the 
operator constructs a play list for each of the vendors based on the awarded 
coverage vectors.    
5.1.2  Algorithm for computing coverage vectors  
We propose an algorithm for computing coverage vectors for vendors using their 
promotion value vectors as inputs. This algorithm makes use of the concept of vendor’s 
marginal value of obtaining a time unit. For a promotion schedule with exposure dose , 
for vendor , the vendor’s marginal value of obtaining the th time unit is defined as 
# − # − 1, denoted #+ which is the value increment brought by the th time 
unit given the existing exposure dose  − 1. Using the value of #+, 1 ≤  ≤ ), we 
can construct marginal value vectors of vendors (Table 5-5 in Section 5.2.2 gives an 
example of vendors’ marginal value vectors). Marginal value vectors are used in the 





Step 1: Computing marginal values. For each vendor, compute marginal values for 
1 ≤  ≤ ) based on their promotion value vector using the formula #+ =
# − # − 1.  
Step 2: Sorting. Sort the marginal values of all vendors in a decreasing order. 
Step 3: Computing coverage vector. Take the first  marginal values as winning 
marginal values. Break the ties randomly. Count the number of winning 
marginal values that belongs to each of the vendors. Assign each vendor the 
number of time units according to the number of their winning marginal values.   
The algorithm solves PSP optimally as stated in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 The proposed algorithm for computing coverage vector solves PSP 
optimally. 
Proof. Given the definition of the marginal value #+ = # − # − 1, we 
have that # = #++# − 1 = ∑ #+./0& . Suppose that 1 = 1, … , 1" is 
the coverage vector returned from the algorithm.  The overall value of 1 is 
∑ #1"&  which can also be represented by marginal values in the form of 
∑ ∑ #+.210&"&  which is the sum of selected marginal values of vendors. Since the 
algorithm selects the largest  marginal values across all vendors, we know that 
∑ #1"&  is the largest value can be achieved with the  time units in the 




5.1.3 A worked example 
In this section an example will be illustrated to show how the DRM Model works, in this 
example we have three vendors (n), four screens (m) and three time units (w). So the 
following will be our summary of the facts: 
w=3     m=4      n=3    max ∑&"  #	2	  
mw= 3 * 4= 12 available time units  
#1 = # − # − 1    Marginal value 
So according to the information we have there are twelve available time units which can 
be assigned to three different vendors, this requires the vendors to submit their complete 
promotion valuation to the operator. 
Step1 and 2 (Submission and coverage vector):   
In this step vendors propose twelve promotion values for the twelve available time units. 
 
 
Figure 5-1: Vendor 1 Promotion Valuation 
Time Unit V1(1) V1(2) V1(3) V1(4) V1(5) V1(6) V1(7) V1(8) V1(9) V1(10) V1(11) V1(12)















Figure 5-2: Vendor 2 Promotion Valuation 
 
 
Figure 5-3: Vendor 3 Promotion Valuation 
After getting the complete promotion value of each vendor we should compute the 
marginal values of each vendor, the following tables show the complete marginal values: 
Vendor (1) 
 
Table 5-1: Vendor 1 Marginal Value 
Time Unit V2(1) V2(2) V2(3) V2(4) V2(5) V2(6) V2(7) V2(8) V2(9) V2(10) V2(11) V2(12)







V2(1) V2(2) V2(3) V2(4) V2(5) V2(6) V2(7) V2(8) V2(9) V2(10) V2(11) V2(12)
Promotion Value 
Promotion Value
Time Unit V3(1) V3(2) V3(3) V3(4) V3(5) V3(6) V3(7) V3(8) V3(9) V3(10) V3(11) V3(12)



















Table 5-3: Vendor 3 Marginal Value 
The next step is to sort all these marginal values in a decreasing order and the first twelve 
marginal values are the winners. 
Winners (Sorted): 
 



















5.2 Iterative Bidding Model  
The iterative bidding model allows vendors to gradually submit their valuation on a need 
to reveal basis. Specifically, the mechanism is implemented using a multiple-object 
ascending auction. We first present the ascending auction protocol. We then describe two 
payment schemes which are suitable for competitive market settings where vendors are 
“price takers” and game theoretic settings where vendors will behave strategically to 
influence the price of time units. The auction prices time unit. It does not distinguish time 
units of different screens in a store. 
5.2.1 Ascending auction 
Starting with a reserve price, the operator announces a current price 3 of a time unit. 
Vendors report back the quantity demanded at 3. We assume that vendors follow a 
myopic best-response bidding strategy (this strategy will be justified later in this 
subsection by the application of “clinched” payment scheme). According to the best-
response bidding strategy, vendors maximize their utilities given the current price. That 
is, the quantity demanded by vendor  at price 3 is 43 such that #+5436 > 3. In 
words, a vendor will demand a time unit if its marginal promotion value is greater than 
the price they pay for it. If the aggregate demand from all vendors is greater than the 
available supply, that is∑ 43"& > , the operator raises the price by an increment 7. 
The process continues until the market clears, that is the aggregate demand of all vendors 
is less than or equal to the available  time units at market clearing price 3∗. If  =
∑ 43∗"& , the supply matches the aggregate demand exactly at the clearing price 3∗. In 




values are less than or equal to 3∗. In other words, the operator selects the largest  
marginal values across all vendors. It follows that if supply matches demand exactly at 
the clearing price, the auction solves PCP optimally. On the other hand, if  
∑ 43∗ <"&  at	3∗, there are  − ∑ 43∗"&  free time units left at termination. 
Given the iterative bidding structure, the only way to reduce the number of free time units 
is to decrease 7.  However, for large scale problems, ε cannot be too small since a smaller 
ε leads to higher number of rounds of bidding, which increases computation overhead. 
Therefore, the issue of free time units needs to be addressed by an additional allocation 
procedure. We randomly assign the free time units to the demand dropped when price 
increases from 3∗ − 7 to 3∗.  The implementation of the additional allocation procedure 
and the analysis of its impact will be a future work. 
5.2.2 Vendors’ payments  
At the termination of auction, the operator charges vendors for the time units assigned to 
them. A straightforward payment scheme is to require vendors to pay their final demands 
evaluated at the final clearing price. We refer to this payment scheme as uniform 
payments as vendors pay time units at the uniform clearing price. In the case that  >
∑ 43∗"& , some vendors can be assigned extra time units after termination. For these 








Time Units Vendor A Vendor B 
1 $99.80  $100  
2 $83.20  $87.10  
3 $77.90  $82.70  
4 $74.70  $80.10  
5 $72.40  $78.10  
6 $70.60  $76.60  
7 $69.10  $75.40  
8 $67.90  $74.30  
9 $66.80  $73.40  
10 $65.90  $72.70  
Table 5-5: Vendors’ marginal values for the ten time units 
 
Price Vendor A Vendor B 
$65  
Demand=10, Clinched=0 Demand=10, Clinched=0 
Cumulative payment=0 Cumulative payment=0 
$65.90  
Demand=9, Clinched=0 Demand=10, Clinched=1 
Cumulative payment=0 Cumulative payment=65.9 
$66.80  
Demand=8, Clinched=0 Demand=10, Clinched=2 
Cumulative payment=0 Cumulative payment=132.7 
$67.90  
Demand=7, Clinched=0 Demand=10, Clinched=3 
Cumulative payment=0 Cumulative payment=200.6 
$69.10  
Demand=6, Clinched=0 Demand=10, Clinched=4 
Cumulative payment=0 Cumulative payment=269.7 
$70.60  
Demand=5, Clinched=0 Demand=10, Clinched=5 
Cumulative payment=0 Cumulative payment=340.3 
$72.40  
Demand=4, Clinched=0 Demand=10, Clinched=6 
Cumulative payment=0 Cumulative payment=412.7 
$72.70  
Demand=4, Clinched=1 Demand=9, Clinched=6 
Cumulative payment=72.7 Cumulative payment=412.7 
$73.40  
Demand=4, Clinched=2 Demand=8, Clinched=6 
Cumulative payment=146.1 Cumulative payment=412.7 
$74.30  
Demand=4, Clinched=3 Demand=7, Clinched=6 
Cumulative payment=220.4 Cumulative payment=412.7 
$74.70  
Demand=3, Clinched=3 Demand=7, Clinched=7 
Cumulative payment=220.4 Cumulative payment= 487.4 
Table 5-6: Summary of the changes of demand, clinched time units, and cumulative payments of 





In competitive market settings where there are a large number of competing vendors and 
no vendors dominate the market, uniform payments motivate vendors to adopt myopic 
bidding strategy. They truthfully report their quantity demanded at a price since, in a 
competitive market setting, the impact of an individual’s strategic behavior on the market 
price is negligible. However, in game theoretic settings where there are a small number of 
competing vendors or a small group of vendors dominate the market, uniform payments 
are not sufficient in terms of motivating vendors to adopt myopic bidding strategy. As 
pointed out in (Ausubel L. M., 2004), dominant vendors have strong incentive to reduce 
demand in order to depress the price. For the game theoretic settings, we adopt a 
“clinched” payment scheme which was originally proposed by Ausubel (2004). The 
payment scheme computes VCG payments in general multiple-object ascending auctions, 
which makes the auctions strategic proof. Therefore, in our DSN promotion scheduling, 
the “clinched” payment motivates the vendors to adopt the myopic bidding strategy. In 
the following, we explain how this payment scheme is applied to DSN promotion 
scheduling through an illustrative example.  
Consider a simplified DSN setting with two vendors, denoted A and B, ten available time 
units to be sold. Vendors have diminishing marginal values over the number of time 
units, which are shown in Table 5-5. We adopt the “clinching” rule to credit time units to 
vendors along the bidding process. Table 5-6 summaries the changes of demand, clinched 
time units, and cumulative payments of vendors as the price advances. Suppose that the 
auction begins with the operator announcing a price of $65. Vendors A and B, adopting 
myopic bidding strategy according to the marginal values of Table 1, would response 




available supply of 10, the operator subsequently adjusts the price by adding a price 
increment 7 = 0.1. The aggregate demand is still 20 with the updated price. The operator 
increases the price continuously. When price reaches $65.9, vendor A reduces their 
quantity demanded from 10 to 9. At this point, the aggregate demand of 19 continues to 
exceed the available supply of 10. However, from Vendor B’s perspective, the competing 
demands from other vendors (only Vendor A in this example) are 9 which is less than the 
available supply of 10. If Vendor A bids monotonically, Vendor B is now mathematically 
guaranteed to win at least one time unit. In the language of Ausubel (2004), Vendor B has 
“clinched” winning one time unit. The auction then awards Vendor B one time unit at the 
clinching price of $65.9. Vendor A reduces their quantity demanded to 8 at $66.8 and 
Vendor B clinches to win another time unit at $66.8. Since there is still excess demand, 
the price must rise further.  Vendor A continues to drop their demand at $67.9, $69.1, 
$70.6, and $72.4. At $72.7, Vendor B starts dropping their demand to 9 and Vendor A 
clinches to win one time unit. The price continues to rise. At $74.7, the market clears. 
Vendor A, who had already clinched time units at $72.7, $73.4 and $74.3, wins 3 time 
units and pays the cumulative payment of $220.4. Vendor B, who had already clinched 
time units at $65.9, $66.8, $67.9, $69.1, $70.6, $72.4 and $74.7, wins 7 time units and 
pays the cumulative payment of $487.4.  The overall value of the assignment is $840.9. 
Observe that, for each vendor, the quantity demanded at the final price equals the sum of 
all time units credited along the way. Since many of the credits occurred at earlier prices, 
however, vendors’ payments do not generally equal their final demands evaluated at the 
final price. Rather, the vendors’ payments are related to those from the VCG mechanism 




5.2.3 A Worked Example with Four Vendors 
This example is different from the previous example because a different approach is used 
for the promotion scheduling; this approach is named as Iterative bidding model. This 
model happens in an ascending auction environment which means there is a start price at 
the beginning of the auction and each round there should be at least a standard price 
increment till the demand matches the supply. 
In our example we have an auctioneer who wants to sell 6 time units to four available 
vendors who are willing to bid for these time units, there is a certain limit for each vendor 
they can’t get more than 4 time units, In order to give the time units to the vendors who 
value it the most an iterative auction is needed, The following table and diagram show the 
marginal values of each vendor for different amount of time units. 
 Vendor A Vendor B Vendor C Vendor D 
Marginal Value $ (1 time unit) 45 57 51 60 
Marginal Value $ (2time units) 25 35 42 49 
Marginal Value $ (3time units) 20 28 30 29 
Marginal Value $ (4time units) 17 12 21 14 





Figure 5-4: Worked example marginal values 
 
The next step is to perform the auction rounds to determine the winning vendors. The 
price increment standard for this auction is 5 $. 
Vendors   4 
Price Increment limit (∈  5$ 
Available Time Units  6 
Time units per vendor limit  4 
Round 1 
The starting price for this auction is 20$, this means all the vendors who are willing to 
pay less or equal to 20 $ for their time units will get out of the bidding for that specific 






Price  A B C D 
20$ 2 3 4 3 
Figure 5-5: Round 1 
 
The demand is 2+3+4+3=12 but the supply is 6 so the auction should continue to the next 
round, as it can be seen in the table vendors A, B and D get out of their bidding for the 4 
units because their marginal value was less than 20$, also vendor A loses his bidding for 
three time units as it is equal to 20$. 
Round 2 
The price for next round is 25$ and the table below shows the new bidding situation for 
all vendors:  
Price A B C D 
25$ 1 3 3 3 
Figure 5-6: Round 2 
 
As it can be seen in the table Vendor A gets out of his biding for 2 and 3 time units 
because they were less than 25$, also the vendor C get out of his bidding for the 4 time 
units, The demand is right now at ten time units but our supply is at six, that means the 







In this round the auction price is increased with 5 $ which means the price is at 30$, the 
following situation would happen to our bidders table: 
Price A B C D 
30$ 1 2 2 2 
Figure 5-7: Round 3 
 
As it can be seen in the table bidders B, C, D each loose another time unit because of the 
ascending auction but they all also get a clinched winning time unit at 30 $ because in the 
ascending auction environment the summation of the rest of the bidders in comparison to 
them equals five (1+2+2) while the supply is six, this means they are all going to win one 
time unit for sure. 
The market is still not cleared yet because we have seven demands at this point while the 
supply is six so the auction must move to the fourth round. 
Round 4 
In this round another 5$ increment is applied to the price which brings the auction price 
to 35$, the result of bidders is summarized in the below table: 
Price A B C D 
35$ 1 1 2 2 





As the table shows bidder B losses his two time units bidding because it was 35$, so at 
this point all the other vendors get their time units because the demand matches the 
supply which means the market is cleared and no further auction rounds is needed. 
5.3 Auction Protocol Implementation 
Figure 5-9 describes the interaction between the operator and the vendor under the 
proposed auction protocol. Once a new advertising window is ready for sale, the operator 
notifies the registered vendors by sending the start-of-auction message. The operator then 
announces the first round unit price (also called reserve unit price). After receiving the 
announced price, vendors compute the number of units they demand based on their 
individual promotion valuations and response with the quantities demanded. Based on the 
quantities returned from vendors, The operator computes the screen units credited to each 
of the vendors at the current price and verifies whether the supply and demand are 
balanced. If not, the operator will increase the unit price and notifies vendors with the 
updated price and the number of credited units. Once the market is cleared at a certain 
round, the operator will terminate the auction by sending the final schedule and payments 
















Chapter 6                                                
Implementation and Verification 
In the PSP formulation presented previously, the number of time units that can be 
assigned to a vendor is restricted by their vendor limits. The vendor limit indicates the 
level of customization that vendors can possibly achieve in DSN promotion scheduling. 
A higher limit provides vendors with the flexibility to adjust their advertising exposure 
doses in a larger range. Vendors, of cause, do not have to purchase time units to the limit. 
However, a lower limit puts a restriction on vendors’ customization capability. This 
section evaluates the revenue performance of the iterative bidding through a 
computational study. 
6.1 System Implementation  
We coded the iterative bidding model using Microsoft Visual Basic. The prototype 
consists of a data generator which randomly generates problem data, a database which 
stores the generated problem data, and an iterative bidding module equipped with both 
clinched and uniform payment scheme. A user interface for the bidding module is also 
implemented. Figure 6-1 is a screen shot of the user interface. All experiments were 
conducted on a PC with a 2.4 GHz CPU. For any of the instances, the solving time of 
iterative bidding is less than 60 seconds. Some sample solving times can be seen in the 
table 6-1. It seems that computation time is not a main constraint for the benchmark 





Payment  Model  Group  Start Price Price increment Available time units  Vendor limit  Solving Time  
Uniform  1 10$ 0.1 200 80 14 seconds 
Uniform  1 10$ 0.1 200 200 17 seconds 
Clinched  1 10$ 0.1  200 80 21 seconds 
Clinched  1 10$ 0.1  200 200 22 seconds 
Uniform  10 10$ 0.1 200 80 22 seconds 
Uniform  10 10$ 0.1 200 200 58 seconds 
Clinched  10 10$ 0.1  200 80 37 seconds 
Clinched  10 10$ 0.1  200 200 59 seconds 
Table 6-1: Solving times 
 
 





6.2 Design of the testing problems  
We assume a relatively smaller VMI setting which consists of 5 vendors and 200 
available time units for scheduling within an advertising time window. Vendors in an 
instance are distinguished by their advertising response functions. For each vendor, their 
advertising response function is characterized by the value of alpha and beta. As 
mentioned previously, alpha indicates the effectiveness of the content and beta indicates 
the sensitivity of the product to advertising. Alphas are randomly drawn from a uniform 
distribution <= − >?"@A , = +
>?"@
A , where <$, B	represents a uniform probability 
distribution between $ and	B; =is the predetermined mean of alpha and C$D is the 
range of the distribution for . Similarly, betas are randomly drawn from a uniform 
distribution <̅ − >?"@FA , ̅ +
>?"@F
A , where ̅is the predetermined mean of beta and 
C$D is the range of the distribution for  . The range of alpha controls the 
distribution of advertisements’ effectiveness. The range of beta controls the distribution 
of the products’ sensitivity to advertising.  The larger the ranges, the more diverse the 
vendors in terms of their advertising response functions. We generated 10 groups of 
problem instances with increasing level of diversities. For these groups, we fixed = to 0.8 
which is higher than the data presented in (Jones J. P., 2006). This is justifiable since 
DSN has higher ad recall rate than that of traditional media (PRN, 2012). We also fixed ̅ 
to 1.0, which is consistent with the data presented in (Jones J. P., 2006).  is assumed to 
be 100 for all vendors. Promotion values are equal to the sales uplift. Details of problem 





Group Mean of alpha Alpha Range Mean of beta Beta Range 
1 0.8 0.02 1.0 0.10 
2 0.8 0.04 1.0 0.20 
3 0.8 0.06 1.0 0.30 
4 0.8 0.08 1.0 0.40 
5 0.8 0.10 1.0 0.50 
6 0.8 0.12 1.0 0.60 
7 0.8 0.14 1.0 0.70 
8 0.8 0.16 1.0 0.80 
9 0.8 0.18 1.0 0.90 
10 0.8 0.20 1.0 1.00 
Table 6-2: Configuration of problem instances: Group 1-10 
 
An important objective of the proposed DSN promotion scheduling approach is to 
provide vendors with customized promotion schedules. To evaluate the customization 
performance of the proposed approach, problem instances with various levels of diversity 
is necessary since if vendors’ requirements are identical or very similar, customization 
will not have significant impact on systems’ performance. In the following subsection, 
we evaluate the performance of the iterative bidding model under various vendor limits.  
6.3 Solution value under various vendor limits  
In the case of the testing data designed for this thesis, we have 200 time units during a 
promotion window. If we set vendor limit to 40, there will be no competition between 
vendors. The iterative bidding model will allocate a fixed number of 40 time units to each 




minimal vendor limit the operator wants to assign. We solve the 10 groups of instances 
using the iterative model. Table 6-3 shows the solution value performance for all 10 
groups of problems under 4 vendor limits: VL=50, VL=100, VL=150, VL=200. It is 
observed that for all 10 groups, a higher vendor limit, or in other words, higher 
customization level results in higher solution values, especially for high-diversity groups. 
For example, Group 10’s average promotion value increases from 4264.8 to 10354.8 
when the vendor limit increases from 50 to 200.  This is because vendors in high-
diversity groups have quite different promotion values on an exposure dose and, in this 
case, a customization procedure helps allocate the time units to the vendors who need 
them the most, thus improve overall value of solutions. 
 
  VL=50 VL=100 VL=150 VL=200 
G1 7172.2 7217 7217 7217 
G2 6778 7065 7065 7065 
G3 6188.2 7218 7218 7218 
G4 5548.2 6735 6735 6735 
G5 3639.4 6684.1 6684.1 6684.1 
G6 5272.3 7319.4 8316.4 8543.7 
G7 5663.9 9876.4 10087.2 10087.2 
G8 5432.6 7476 8247.8 8717.2 
G9 7249 9050 9690.2 10126 
G10 4264.4 7907.5 9182 10354.8 
Table 6-3: Promotion value performance 
 
6.4 Revenue performance of iterative bidding  
In the iterative bidding model, the clinched payment scheme motivates vendors to 
truthfully report their demand along the bidding process. However, these benefits are 
obtained with a cost of losing revenue. Under the clinched payment scheme, many of the 




their final demands evaluated at the final prices. In the following we evaluate the revenue 
performance of the iterative bidding under clinched payments through experiments. 
Groups VL=40% VL=100% 
G1 96.40% 96.40% 
G2 96.30% 96.30% 
G3 95.10% 95.90% 
G4 94.80% 96.00% 
G5 93.70% 95.30% 
G6 89.80% 94.90% 
G7 91.30% 93.60% 
G8 84.40% 94.70% 
G9 90.50% 91.30% 
G10 88.40% 77.40% 
Table 6-4: Ratio of Revenue 
 
We use the same problem groups as we used in the vendor limit testing.  We tested the 
revenue performance of clinched payment scheme in comparison with uniform payment 
scheme under two vendor limits: VL=80 (40%) and VL=200 (100%). Table 6-4 shows 
the ratio of the revenue under clinched payments to the revenue under uniform payments 
on all 10 groups of problem instances. It is observed that, for the low-diversity problem 
groups, the revenue performance of clinched payment is pretty good (above 90%) under 
both VL=40% and VL=100%. For high-diversity problems, the revenue performance of 
clinched payments can decrease up to 20% compared to that of the low-diversity 
problems. This is because vendors’ values vary to a larger extent in high-diversity 
problems, which results in a higher chance for allocations to be clinched at earlier prices, 
thus depress the revenue. The revenue decrease observed here is the cost needed to 





Chapter 7                                        
Conclusions 
 In today’s increasingly virtual and volatile market, DSN promotion scheduling has to 
response to vendors’ changing requirements in a timely manner and, at the same time, 
balance the customization requirements across all vendors. We propose automated 
scheduling models which concurrently customize vendors’ promotion schedules and 
optimize overall system performance. The models are designed based on the direct 
revelation mechanism and iterative bidding with uniform and clinched payment schemes, 
which make them suitable for both competitive and game theoretic settings. In addition, 
the level of customization can be adjusted by assigning different vendor purchasing 
limits. We show that the proposed direct revelation mechanism computes optimal 
solutions to the DSN promotion scheduling problem. For the iterative bidding model, our 
experimental results show that the iterative bidding model exhibits good revenue 
performance.  
Our work is ongoing in several areas, namely content customization and quality 
assessment, advanced advertising response models, and interactive DSN scheduling. 
Current multimedia technology supports dynamic content configuration. For example, 
content’s language, text message, and background scenes can be configured on the fly. 
We are investigating how to predict the effectiveness of various content configurations 
given specific demographics of the audience and how to effectively incorporate this 




purchased time units, a good adverting response model is critical to high quality 
estimation. In Section 3, we proposed a simple advertising response function which 
assumes that vendors are indifferent from the locations of the screens. However, casual 
observation and the literature (Gutierrez B. P., 2008) reveal that a particular location does 
not have the same exposure effectiveness for all vendors. While certain locations such as 
the entrance and the checkout counters can be desirable for most of the vendors, a 
packaged goods vendor (e.g. P&G) will prefer promoting their shampoo brands on the 
screens located in the grocery department rather than the electronics department. Since 
the exposure effectiveness of a location is vendor dependent, we plan to develop more 
practical advertising response models to reflect the location differences of vendors. 
Approaches based on data mining techniques will be used to build the correlation 
between the exposure doses at various locations and the resulted sales uplift. Finally, 
techniques that collect audience feedback will also be integrated into the automated 
promotion scheduling system. Along this direction, we will investigate the effectiveness 
assessment models that incorporate the audience attention information captured by the 
on-screen cameras based on our previous experiments on eye-tracking systems (Jin, 
Zeng, & Wang, 2010). In all these research activities, insights derived from extensive 
simulation and on-site experiments will play an essential role in guiding system design 



















Public Class Form1 
 




        TextBox1.Clear()   ' Clears all the text boxes  
        TxtFP.Clear() 




        Dim S As Decimal = TxtS.Text    ' Gets the values of the text files in the 
form  
        Dim PI As Decimal = TxtPI.Text 
        Dim Time As Integer = TxtT.Text 
        Dim VTLA As Integer = TxtVTL.Text 
        Dim VTLB As Integer = TxtVTL.Text 
        Dim VTLC As Integer = TxtVTL.Text 
        Dim VTLD As Integer = TxtVTL.Text 
        Dim VTLE As Integer = TxtVTL.Text 
        Dim Time2 As Integer 
        'Gets the selected table name as String 
        Dim GroupN As String = LstData.SelectedItem  
 
        'Dim AR As String = TextBox1.Text 
        Dim DACount As Integer = 0 
        Dim DBCount As Integer = 0 
        Dim DCCount As Integer = 0 
        Dim DDCount As Integer = 0 
        Dim DECount As Integer = 0 
        Dim ClinchA As Integer 
        Dim ClinchB As Integer 
        Dim ClinchC As Integer 
        Dim ClinchD As Integer 
        Dim ClinchE As Integer 
        Dim RevClA As Integer 
        Dim RevClB As Integer 




        Dim RevClD As Integer 
        Dim RevClE As Integer 
        Dim RevClACount As Integer 
        Dim RevClBCount As Integer 
        Dim RevClCCount As Integer 
        Dim RevClDCount As Integer 
        Dim RevClECount As Integer 
 
        
 
        Dim DT As Integer 
 
        ' --------------------------------  First Auction Round 
 
        ' Makes the connection to the database 
 
        Dim Conn1 As New OleDbConnection("Provider=Microsoft.JET.OLEDB.4.0;" & _ 
              "Data Source=C:\\Users\\Kourosh\\Documents\\Auction.mdb;")         
        Conn1.Open() 
 
        Dim Trans1 As OleDb.OleDbTransaction 
        Trans1 = Conn1.BeginTransaction 
 
 
        Dim CmdA1 As New OleDb.OleDbCommand 
 
        Dim CmdB1 As New OleDb.OleDbCommand 
 
        Dim CmdC1 As New OleDb.OleDbCommand 
 
        Dim CmdD1 As New OleDb.OleDbCommand 
 
        Dim CmdE1 As New OleDb.OleDbCommand 
 
 
' Produces the query statement for selecting the marginal values higher than the            
start price  
 
        CmdA1.CommandText = "SELECT  A FROM  " & GroupN & "  WHERE A > '" & S & "'  
" 
 
        CmdB1.CommandText = "SELECT  B FROM  " & GroupN & "  WHERE B > '" & S & "'  
" 
 
        CmdC1.CommandText = "SELECT  C FROM  " & GroupN & "  WHERE C > '" & S & "'  
" 
 
        CmdD1.CommandText = "SELECT  D FROM  " & GroupN & "  WHERE D > '" & S & "'  
" 
 
        CmdE1.CommandText = "SELECT  E FROM  " & GroupN & "  WHERE E > '" & S & "'  
" 
 
        CmdA1.Connection = Conn1 
 
        CmdA1.Transaction = Trans1 
 





        CmdB1.Transaction = Trans1 
 
        CmdC1.Connection = Conn1 
 
        CmdC1.Transaction = Trans1 
 
        CmdD1.Connection = Conn1 
 
        CmdD1.Transaction = Trans1 
 
        CmdE1.Connection = Conn1 
 




        Dim MyReaderA1 As OleDb.OleDbDataReader 
 
        MyReaderA1 = CmdA1.ExecuteReader 
 
       ' Reads the data and checks the vendor time unit limit 
 
 
        Do While MyReaderA1.Read And DACount < VTLA      
            Dim DA As String = MyReaderA1.Item("A")       
 
            DACount = DACount + 1      ' Counts the amount of demand read for 
vendor A  
             
        Loop 
 




        Dim MyReaderB1 As OleDb.OleDbDataReader 
 
        MyReaderB1 = CmdB1.ExecuteReader 
 
        ' Reads the data and checks the vendor time unit limit 
 
        Do While MyReaderB1.Read And DBCount < VTLB   
 
      ' Counts the amount of demand read for vendor B  
 
            Dim DB As String = MyReaderB1.Item("B")     
            DBCount = DBCount + 1 
 
        Loop 
 
        MyReaderB1.Close() 
 
 
        Dim MyReaderC1 As OleDb.OleDbDataReader 
 





        Do While MyReaderC1.Read And DCCount < VTLC 
 
            Dim DC As String = MyReaderC1.Item("C") 
            DCCount = DCCount + 1 
            
        Loop 
 
        MyReaderC1.Close() 
 
 
        Dim MyReaderD1 As OleDb.OleDbDataReader 
 
        MyReaderD1 = CmdD1.ExecuteReader 
 
        Do While MyReaderD1.Read And DDCount < VTLD 
 
            Dim DD As String = MyReaderD1.Item("D") 
            DDCount = DDCount + 1 
 
        Loop 
 
        MyReaderD1.Close() 
 
 
        Dim MyReaderE1 As OleDb.OleDbDataReader 
 
        MyReaderE1 = CmdE1.ExecuteReader 
 
        Do While MyReaderE1.Read And DECount < VTLE 
 
            Dim DE As String = MyReaderE1.Item("E") 
            DECount = DECount + 1 
             
        Loop 
 
        MyReaderE1.Close() 
 
 
        '-----------------------------------  Clinch Check for different Vendors  
 
 
        If DACount > 1 And (DBCount + DCCount + DDCount + DECount) < Time Then    
' Checks if A has any clinched wins  
 
            ClinchA = 1 
            RevClA = RevClA + (ClinchA * S)    ' If there is a clinched win the 
revenue is calculated at that price 
            RevClACount = RevClACount + 1       ' Add one to the amount of the 
clinched revenue count  
           
 
        Else 
            ClinchA = ClinchA     ' If there is no clinched win the amount is 
equal to the former one  
 





        TextBox1.Text = TextBox1.Text & "Price:" & S & "  \  DemandA:" & DACount & 




        If DBCount > 1 And (DACount + DCCount + DDCount + DECount) < Time Then  ' 
Checks if B has any clinched wins  
 
            ClinchB = 1 
            RevClB = RevClB + (ClinchB * S)     ' If there is a clinched win the 
revenue is calculated at that price 
            RevClBCount = RevClBCount + 1 
             
        Else 
            ClinchB = ClinchB 
 
        End If 
 
        TextBox1.Text = TextBox1.Text & "   \ DemandB:" & DBCount & "  -  B 
Clinched:" & ClinchB 
 
 
        If DCCount > 1 And (DACount + DBCount + DDCount + DECount) < Time Then 
 
            ClinchC = 1 
            RevClC = RevClC + (ClinchC * S) 
            RevClCCount = RevClCCount + 1 
 
             
        Else 
            ClinchC = ClinchC 
 
        End If 
 
        TextBox1.Text = TextBox1.Text & "  \ DemandC:" & DCCount & " -  C 
Clinched:" & ClinchC 
 
 
        If DDCount > 1 And (DACount + DBCount + DCCount + DECount) < Time Then 
 
            ClinchD = 1 
            RevClD = RevClD + (ClinchD * S) 
            RevClDCount = RevClDCount + 1 
 
 
        Else 
            ClinchD = ClinchD 
 
        End If 
 
        TextBox1.Text = TextBox1.Text & "  \ DemandD:" & DDCount & " -  D 
Clinched:" & ClinchD 
 
 
        If DECount > 1 And (DACount + DBCount + DCCount + DDCount) < Time Then 
 
            ClinchE = 1 




            RevClECount = RevClECount + 1 
             
        Else 
            ClinchE = ClinchE 
 
        End If 
 
' Checks the amount of total demand 
 
        DT = (DACount + DBCount + DCCount + DDCount + DECount)     
        TextBox1.Text = TextBox1.Text & "  \ DemandE:" & DECount & " - E 
Clinched:" & ClinchE & "    --> " & " Total Demand:" & DT & "- Total Clinch:" & 
(ClinchA + ClinchB + ClinchC + ClinchD + ClinchE) & vbNewLine & vbNewLine 
        Time2 = Time - (ClinchA + ClinchB + ClinchC + ClinchD + ClinchE)  ' 
updates the available time limit  
 
 
        Conn1.Close() 
 
 
        '--------------------------------------------   Loop for Auction rounds  
 
 
       ' Database Connection 
 
        Dim Conn As New OleDbConnection("Provider=Microsoft.JET.OLEDB.4.0;" & _ 
       "Data Source=C:\\Users\\Kourosh\\Documents\\Auction.mdb;")    
        Conn.Open() 
 
 
       ' Stays in the loop till the amount of demands equals the available time 
units 
 
        Do While DT > Time2    
 





            Dim CmdA As New OleDb.OleDbCommand 
 
            Dim CmdB As New OleDb.OleDbCommand 
 
            Dim CmdC As New OleDb.OleDbCommand 
 
            Dim CmdD As New OleDb.OleDbCommand 
 
            Dim CmdE As New OleDb.OleDbCommand 
 
 
            CmdA.CommandText = "SELECT  A FROM  " & GroupN & "  WHERE A > '" & S & 
"'  "   ' Produces the query statement for selecting the marginal values higher 
than the current price  
 
            CmdB.CommandText = "SELECT  B FROM  " & GroupN & "  WHERE B > '" & S & 
"'  "   ' Produces the query statement for selecting the marginal values higher 





            CmdC.CommandText = "SELECT  C FROM  " & GroupN & "  WHERE C > '" & S & 
"'  " 
 
            CmdD.CommandText = "SELECT  D FROM  " & GroupN & "  WHERE D > '" & S & 
"'  " 
 
            CmdE.CommandText = "SELECT  E FROM  " & GroupN & "  WHERE E > '" & S & 
"'  " 
 
            CmdA.Connection = Conn 
 
            'CmdA.Transaction = Trans 
 
            CmdB.Connection = Conn 
 
            'CmdB.Transaction = Trans 
 
            CmdC.Connection = Conn 
 
            'CmdC.Transaction = Trans 
 
            CmdD.Connection = Conn 
 
            'CmdD.Transaction = Trans 
 
            CmdE.Connection = Conn 
 
            ' CmdE.Transaction = Trans 
 
            DACount = 0 - ClinchA   ' The amount of clinched win of the vendor is 
subtracted  
            DBCount = 0 - ClinchB 
            DCCount = 0 - ClinchC 
            DDCount = 0 - ClinchD 
            DECount = 0 - ClinchE 
 
            Dim MyReaderA As OleDb.OleDbDataReader 
 
            MyReaderA = CmdA.ExecuteReader 
 
            Do While MyReaderA.Read And DACount < VTLA  ' Checks the vendor time 
unit limit during the reading process 
 
                Dim DA As String = MyReaderA.Item("A") 
 
                DACount = DACount + 1   ' Counts the amount of demand read for 
vendor A 
                 
            Loop 
 
            MyReaderA.Close() 
 
 
            Dim MyReaderB As OleDb.OleDbDataReader 
 





            Do While MyReaderB.Read And DBCount < VTLB  ' Checks the vendor time 
unit limit during the reading process 
 
                Dim DB As String = MyReaderB.Item("B") 
                DBCount = DBCount + 1    ' Counts the amount of demand read for 
vendor B 
 
            Loop 
 
            MyReaderB.Close() 
 
 
            Dim MyReaderC As OleDb.OleDbDataReader 
 
            MyReaderC = CmdC.ExecuteReader 
 
            Do While MyReaderC.Read And DCCount < VTLC 
 
                Dim DC As String = MyReaderC.Item("C") 
                DCCount = DCCount + 1 
                ' 
            Loop 
 
            MyReaderC.Close() 
 
 
            Dim MyReaderD As OleDb.OleDbDataReader 
 
            MyReaderD = CmdD.ExecuteReader 
 
            Do While MyReaderD.Read And DDCount < VTLD 
 
                Dim DD As String = MyReaderD.Item("D") 
                DDCount = DDCount + 1 
                 
            Loop 
 
            MyReaderD.Close() 
 
 
            Dim MyReaderE As OleDb.OleDbDataReader 
 
            MyReaderE = CmdE.ExecuteReader 
 
            Do While MyReaderE.Read And DECount < VTLE 
 
                Dim DE As String = MyReaderE.Item("E") 
                DECount = DECount + 1 
                 
            Loop 
 
            MyReaderE.Close() 
 
 
            '--------------------------------  Clinch Check for Auction Rounds 
Loop  
 





            If DACount > 1 And (DDCount + DBCount + DCCount + DECount) < Time Then   
'  
 
                ClinchA = 1 
                RevClA = RevClA + (ClinchA * S)    ' If there is a clinched win 
the revenue is calculated at that price 
                RevClACount = RevClACount + 1       ' Add one to the amount of the 
clinched revenue count 
 
            Else 
                ClinchA = ClinchA 
 
            End If 
 
            TextBox1.Text = TextBox1.Text & " Price:" & S & "  \  DemandA:" & 
DACount & "  - A Clinched:" & ClinchA 
 
 
            If DBCount > 1 And (DDCount + DACount + DCCount + DECount) < Time Then    
' Checks if B has any clinched wins 
 
                ClinchB = 1 
                RevClB = RevClB + (ClinchB * S)   ' If there is a clinched win the 
revenue is calculated at that price 
                RevClBCount = RevClBCount + 1     ' Add one to the amount of the 
clinched revenue count 
 
            Else 
                ClinchB = ClinchB 
 
            End If 
 
            TextBox1.Text = TextBox1.Text & "  \ DemandB:" & DBCount & " - B 
Clinched:" & ClinchB 
 
 
            If DCCount > 1 And (DACount + DBCount + DDCount + DECount) < Time Then 
 
                ClinchC = 1 
                RevClC = RevClC + (ClinchC * S) 
                RevClCCount = RevClCCount + 1 
                 
            Else 
                ClinchC = ClinchC 
 
            End If 
 
            TextBox1.Text = TextBox1.Text & "  \ DemandC:" & DCCount & " - C 
Clinched:" & ClinchC 
 
 
            If DDCount > 1 And (DACount + DBCount + DCCount + DECount) < Time Then 
 
                ClinchD = 1 
                RevClD = RevClD + (ClinchD * S) 
                RevClDCount = RevClDCount + 1 




            Else 
                ClinchD = ClinchD 
 
            End If 
 
            TextBox1.Text = TextBox1.Text & "  \ DemandD:" & DDCount & " - D 
Clinched:" & ClinchD 
 
 
            If DECount > 1 And (DACount + DBCount + DDCount + DCCount) < Time Then 
 
                ClinchE = 1 
                RevClE = RevClE + (ClinchE * S) 
                RevClECount = RevClECount + 1 
                 
            Else 
                ClinchE = ClinchE 
 
            End If 
            ' Checks the amount of total demand  
            DT = (DACount + DBCount + DCCount + DDCount + DECount) 
            TextBox1.Text = TextBox1.Text & "  \ DemandE:" & DECount & " - E 
Clinched:" & ClinchE & "    --> " & " Total Demand:" & DT & "- Total Clinch:" & 
(ClinchA + ClinchB + ClinchC + ClinchD + ClinchE) & vbNewLine & vbNewLine 
            Time2 = Time - (ClinchA + ClinchB + ClinchC + ClinchD + ClinchE)  ' 
updates the available time limit  
 
 
        Loop 
 
        ' Shows the final round result and aslo the revenue gained from each 
vendor  
 
        TxtRev.Text = "Price:" & S & "  \  DemandA:" & DACount & "  - A Clinched:" 
& ClinchA & "  \ DemandB:" & DBCount & " - B Clinched:" & ClinchB & "  \ DemandC:" 
& DCCount & " - C Clinched:" & ClinchC & "  \ DemandD:" & DDCount & " - D 
Clinched:" & ClinchD & "  \ DemandE:" & DECount & " - E Clinched:" & ClinchE & "    
--> " & " Total Demand:" & DT & "- Total Clinch:" & (ClinchA + ClinchB + ClinchC + 
ClinchD + ClinchE) & vbNewLine & vbNewLine 
        TxtRev.Text = TxtRev.Text & "Revenue A:" & (((DACount - RevClACount) * S) 
+ (RevClA)) & "  -  Revenue B:" & (((DBCount - RevClBCount) * S) + (RevClB)) & "  
- Revenue C:" & (((DCCount - RevClCCount) * S) + (RevClC)) & "  -Revenue D:" & 
(((DDCount - RevClDCount) * S) + (RevClD)) & "  - Revenue E:" & (((DECount - 
RevClECount) * S) + (RevClE)) & vbNewLine & vbNewLine 
        TxtRev.Text = TxtRev.Text + "Total Revenue:" & (((DACount - RevClACount) * 
S) + (RevClA) + ((DBCount - RevClBCount) * S) + (RevClB) + ((DCCount - 
RevClCCount) * S) + (RevClC) + ((DDCount - RevClDCount) * S) + (RevClD) + 
((DECount - RevClECount) * S) + (RevClE)) 
 
        ' Shows the final price  
 
        TxtFP.Text = S 
 
        Conn.Close() 
 
 





    Private Sub Form1_Load(sender As System.Object, e As System.EventArgs) Handles 
MyBase.Load 
        
 
        'Variable to hold path to database 
        Dim DatabasePath As String = "C:\\Users\\Kourosh\\Documents\\Auction.mdb;" 
 
        'SQL String to connect to database 
        Dim ConnString As String = _ 
            "Provider=Microsoft.Jet.OLEDB.4.0;" & _ 
            "Data Source=" & DatabasePath & _ 




        Dim SchemaTable As DataTable 
 
        'Connect to the database 
        Dim conn As New System.Data.OleDb.OleDbConnection(ConnString) 
 
        Try 
            LstData.Items.Clear() 
 
            conn.Open() 
 
            'Get table and view names 
            SchemaTable = 
conn.GetOleDbSchemaTable(System.Data.OleDb.OleDbSchemaGuid.Tables, New Object() 
{Nothing, Nothing, Nothing, Nothing}) 
 
            Dim int As Integer 
            For int = 0 To SchemaTable.Rows.Count - 1 
                If SchemaTable.Rows(int)!TABLE_TYPE.ToString = "TABLE" Then 
                    'Add items to list box 
                    LstData.Items.Add(SchemaTable.Rows(int)!TABLE_NAME.ToString()) 
                End If 
            Next 
 
        Catch ex As Exception 
            MessageBox.Show(ex.Message.ToString(), "Data Load Error", 
MessageBoxButtons.OK, MessageBoxIcon.Exclamation) 
        End Try 
 
        conn.Close() 
 
 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub ComboBox1_SelectedIndexChanged(sender As System.Object, e As 
System.EventArgs) 
 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub ComboBox1_SelectedIndexChanged_1(sender As System.Object, e As 
System.EventArgs) 
 





    Private Sub LstData_SelectedIndexChanged(sender As System.Object, e As 
System.EventArgs) Handles LstData.SelectedIndexChanged 
 
 

















Public Class Form1 
 
    Private Sub BtnSt_Click(sender As System.Object, e As System.EventArgs) 
Handles BtnSt.Click 
 
        TextBox1.Clear()   ' clears the text boxes  
        TxtFP.Clear() 
        TxtRev.Clear() 
 
        ' Variable Declaration  
 
        Dim S As Decimal = TxtS.Text  ' Gets the number of text boxes  
        Dim PI As Decimal = TxtPI.Text 
        Dim Time As Integer = TxtT.Text 
        Dim VTLA As Integer = TxtVTL.Text 
        Dim VTLB As Integer = TxtVTL.Text 
        Dim VTLC As Integer = TxtVTL.Text 
        Dim VTLD As Integer = TxtVTL.Text 
        Dim VTLE As Integer = TxtVTL.Text 
 
        Dim GroupN As String = LstData.SelectedItem 
        'Dim AR As String = TextBox1.Text 
        Dim DACount As Integer = 0 
        Dim DBCount As Integer = 0 
        Dim DCCount As Integer = 0 
        Dim DDCount As Integer = 0 
        Dim DECount As Integer = 0 
       




        Dim DT As Integer 
 
        ' --------------------------------  First Auction Round 
 
        ' Database Connection  
 
        Dim Conn1 As New OleDbConnection("Provider=Microsoft.JET.OLEDB.4.0;" & _ 
              "Data Source=C:\\Users\\Kourosh\\Documents\\Auction.mdb;") 





        Dim Trans1 As OleDb.OleDbTransaction 
        Trans1 = Conn1.BeginTransaction 
 
 
        Dim CmdA1 As New OleDb.OleDbCommand 
 
        Dim CmdB1 As New OleDb.OleDbCommand 
 
        Dim CmdC1 As New OleDb.OleDbCommand 
 
        Dim CmdD1 As New OleDb.OleDbCommand 
 
        Dim CmdE1 As New OleDb.OleDbCommand 
 
 
        ' Produces the query statement for selecting the marginal values higher 
than the start price  
 
        CmdA1.CommandText = "SELECT  A FROM  " & GroupN & "  WHERE A > '" & S & "'  
" 
 
        CmdB1.CommandText = "SELECT  B FROM  " & GroupN & "  WHERE B > '" & S & "'  
" 
 
        CmdC1.CommandText = "SELECT  C FROM  " & GroupN & "  WHERE C > '" & S & "'  
" 
 
        CmdD1.CommandText = "SELECT  D FROM  " & GroupN & "  WHERE D > '" & S & "'  
" 
 
        CmdE1.CommandText = "SELECT  E FROM  " & GroupN & "  WHERE E > '" & S & "'  
" 
 
        CmdA1.Connection = Conn1 
 
        CmdA1.Transaction = Trans1 
 
        CmdB1.Connection = Conn1 
 
        CmdB1.Transaction = Trans1 
 
        CmdC1.Connection = Conn1 
 
        CmdC1.Transaction = Trans1 
 
        CmdD1.Connection = Conn1 
 
        CmdD1.Transaction = Trans1 
 
        CmdE1.Connection = Conn1 
 









        Dim MyReaderA1 As OleDb.OleDbDataReader 
 
        MyReaderA1 = CmdA1.ExecuteReader 
 
        Do While MyReaderA1.Read And DACount < VTLA 
 
            Dim DA As String = MyReaderA1.Item("A") 
 
            DACount = DACount + 1  ' Counts the amount of demand read for vendor A 
             
        Loop 
 
        MyReaderA1.Close() 
 
 
        ' Reads the data and checks the vendor time unit limit 
 
        Dim MyReaderB1 As OleDb.OleDbDataReader 
 
        MyReaderB1 = CmdB1.ExecuteReader 
 
        Do While MyReaderB1.Read And DBCount < VTLB 
 
            Dim DB As String = MyReaderB1.Item("B")  ' Counts the amount of demand 
read for vendor A 
            DBCount = DBCount + 1 
 
        Loop 
 
        MyReaderB1.Close() 
 
 
        Dim MyReaderC1 As OleDb.OleDbDataReader 
 
        MyReaderC1 = CmdC1.ExecuteReader 
 
        Do While MyReaderC1.Read And DCCount < VTLC 
 
            Dim DC As String = MyReaderC1.Item("C") 
            DCCount = DCCount + 1 
            'AR = AR & " , " & DC 
            'DataGridView1.Rows.Add(V1) 
        Loop 
 
        MyReaderC1.Close() 
 
 
        Dim MyReaderD1 As OleDb.OleDbDataReader 
 
        MyReaderD1 = CmdD1.ExecuteReader 
 
        Do While MyReaderD1.Read And DDCount < VTLD 
 
            Dim DD As String = MyReaderD1.Item("D") 
            DDCount = DDCount + 1 
            'AR = AR & " , " & DD 
 




        Loop 
 
        MyReaderD1.Close() 
 
 
        Dim MyReaderE1 As OleDb.OleDbDataReader 
 
        MyReaderE1 = CmdE1.ExecuteReader 
 
        Do While MyReaderE1.Read And DECount < VTLE 
 
            Dim DE As String = MyReaderE1.Item("E") 
            DECount = DECount + 1 
            'AR = AR & " , " & DE 
            'DataGridView1.Rows.Add(V1) 
        Loop 
 
        MyReaderE1.Close() 
 
        
 
        TextBox1.Text = TextBox1.Text & "Price:" & S & "  \  DemandA:" & DACount 
 
 
        TextBox1.Text = TextBox1.Text & "   \ DemandB:" & DBCount 
 
 
        TextBox1.Text = TextBox1.Text & "  \ DemandC:" & DCCount 
 




        DT = (DACount + DBCount + DCCount + DDCount + DECount) 
 
        TextBox1.Text = TextBox1.Text & "  \ DemandE:" & DECount & "    --> " & " 




        Conn1.Close() 
 
 
        '----------------------------------------   Loop for Auction rounds  
 
        ' Database Connection  
 
        Dim Conn As New OleDbConnection("Provider=Microsoft.JET.OLEDB.4.0;" & _ 
       "Data Source=C:\\Users\\Kourosh\\Documents\\Auction.mdb;") 
        Conn.Open() 
 
 
        ' Stays in the loop till the amount of demands equals the available time 
units  
 
        Do While DT > Time 
 








            Dim CmdA As New OleDb.OleDbCommand 
 
            Dim CmdB As New OleDb.OleDbCommand 
 
            Dim CmdC As New OleDb.OleDbCommand 
 
            Dim CmdD As New OleDb.OleDbCommand 
 
            Dim CmdE As New OleDb.OleDbCommand 
 
            ' Produces the query statement for selecting the marginal values 
higher than the current price  
 
            CmdA.CommandText = "SELECT  A FROM  " & GroupN & "  WHERE A > '" & S & 
"'  " 
 
            CmdB.CommandText = "SELECT  B FROM  " & GroupN & "  WHERE B > '" & S & 
"'  " 
 
            CmdC.CommandText = "SELECT  C FROM  " & GroupN & "  WHERE C > '" & S & 
"'  " 
 
            CmdD.CommandText = "SELECT  D FROM  " & GroupN & "  WHERE D > '" & S & 
"'  " 
 
            CmdE.CommandText = "SELECT  E FROM  " & GroupN & "  WHERE E > '" & S & 
"'  " 
 
            CmdA.Connection = Conn 
 
            'CmdA.Transaction = Trans 
 
            CmdB.Connection = Conn 
 
            'CmdB.Transaction = Trans 
 
            CmdC.Connection = Conn 
 
            'CmdC.Transaction = Trans 
 
            CmdD.Connection = Conn 
 
            'CmdD.Transaction = Trans 
 
            CmdE.Connection = Conn 
 
            ' CmdE.Transaction = Trans 
 
            DACount = 0 
            DBCount = 0 
            DCCount = 0 
            DDCount = 0 





            ' Checks the vendor time unit limit during the reading process 
 
            Dim MyReaderA As OleDb.OleDbDataReader 
 
            MyReaderA = CmdA.ExecuteReader 
 
            Do While MyReaderA.Read And DACount < VTLA 
 
                Dim DA As String = MyReaderA.Item("A") 
 
                DACount = DACount + 1  ' Counts the amount of demand read for 
vendor A 
                 
            Loop 
 
            MyReaderA.Close() 
 
 
            Dim MyReaderB As OleDb.OleDbDataReader 
 
            MyReaderB = CmdB.ExecuteReader 
 
            Do While MyReaderB.Read And DBCount < VTLB 
 
                Dim DB As String = MyReaderB.Item("B") 
                DBCount = DBCount + 1   ' Counts the amount of demand read for 
vendor B 
 
            Loop 
 
            MyReaderB.Close() 
 
 
            Dim MyReaderC As OleDb.OleDbDataReader 
 
            MyReaderC = CmdC.ExecuteReader 
 
            Do While MyReaderC.Read And DCCount < VTLC 
 
                Dim DC As String = MyReaderC.Item("C") 
                DCCount = DCCount + 1 
                 
            Loop 
 
            MyReaderC.Close() 
 
 
            Dim MyReaderD As OleDb.OleDbDataReader 
 
            MyReaderD = CmdD.ExecuteReader 
 
            Do While MyReaderD.Read And DDCount < VTLD 
 
                Dim DD As String = MyReaderD.Item("D") 
                DDCount = DDCount + 1 
                 





            MyReaderD.Close() 
 
 
            Dim MyReaderE As OleDb.OleDbDataReader 
 
            MyReaderE = CmdE.ExecuteReader 
 
            Do While MyReaderE.Read And DECount < VTLE 
 
                Dim DE As String = MyReaderE.Item("E") 
                DECount = DECount + 1 
                 
            Loop 
 




            TextBox1.Text = TextBox1.Text & " Price:" & S & "  \  DemandA:" & 
DACount 
 
            TextBox1.Text = TextBox1.Text & "  \ DemandB:" & DBCount 
 
            TextBox1.Text = TextBox1.Text & "  \ DemandC:" & DCCount 
 




            TextBox1.Text = TextBox1.Text & "  \ DemandE:" & DECount & "    --> " 
& " Total Demand:" & DT & vbNewLine & vbNewLine 
 
            ' Checks the amount of total demand  
 
            DT = (DACount + DBCount + DCCount + DDCount + DECount) 
 
        Loop 
 
        ' Shows the final round result and aslo the revenue gained from each 
vendor 
 
        TxtRev.Text = "Price:" & S & "  \  DemandA:" & DACount & "  \ DemandB:" & 
DBCount & "  \ DemandC:" & DCCount & "  \ DemandD:" & DDCount & "  \ DemandE:" & 
DECount & "    --> " & " Total Demand:" & DT & vbNewLine & vbNewLine 
        TxtRev.Text = TxtRev.Text & "Revenue A:" & (DACount * S) & "  -  Revenue 
B:" & (DBCount * S) & "  - Revenue C:" & (DCCount * S) & "  -Revenue D:" & 
(DDCount * S) & "  - Revenue E:" & (DECount * S) & vbNewLine & vbNewLine 
        TxtRev.Text = TxtRev.Text + "Total Revenue:" & (DACount * S) + (DBCount * 
S) + (DCCount * S) + (DDCount * S) + (DECount * S) 
 
        'Shows the final price  
 
        TxtFP.Text = S 
 







    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub LstData_SelectedIndexChanged(sender As System.Object, e As 
System.EventArgs) Handles LstData.SelectedIndexChanged 
 
    End Sub 
 
 
    Private Sub Form1_Load(sender As System.Object, e As System.EventArgs) Handles 
MyBase.Load 
         
 
        'Variable to hold path to database 
        Dim DatabasePath As String = "C:\\Users\\Kourosh\\Documents\\Auction.mdb;" 
 
        'SQL String to connect to database 
        Dim ConnString As String = _ 
            "Provider=Microsoft.Jet.OLEDB.4.0;" & _ 
            "Data Source=" & DatabasePath & _ 




        Dim SchemaTable As DataTable 
 
        'Connect to the database 
        Dim conn As New System.Data.OleDb.OleDbConnection(ConnString) 
 
        Try 
            LstData.Items.Clear() 
 
            conn.Open() 
 
            'Get table and view names 
            SchemaTable = 
conn.GetOleDbSchemaTable(System.Data.OleDb.OleDbSchemaGuid.Tables, New Object() 
{Nothing, Nothing, Nothing, Nothing}) 
 
            Dim int As Integer 
            For int = 0 To SchemaTable.Rows.Count - 1 
                If SchemaTable.Rows(int)!TABLE_TYPE.ToString = "TABLE" Then 
                    'Add items to list box 
                    LstData.Items.Add(SchemaTable.Rows(int)!TABLE_NAME.ToString()) 
                End If 
            Next 
 
        Catch ex As Exception 
            MessageBox.Show(ex.Message.ToString(), "Data Load Error", 
MessageBoxButtons.OK, MessageBoxIcon.Exclamation) 
        End Try 
 
        conn.Close() 
 
 






    Private Sub TxtPI_TextChanged(sender As System.Object, e As System.EventArgs) 
Handles TxtPI.TextChanged 
 

















Public Class Form1 
 
    Dim array() As String = {"A", "B", "C", "D", "E"} 
    Dim array2() As String 
 
    Private Sub Form1_Load(sender As System.Object, e As System.EventArgs) Handles 
MyBase.Load 
 
    End Sub 
 
 
    Private Sub BtnGD_Click(ByVal sender As System.Object, ByVal e As 
System.EventArgs) Handles BtnGD.Click 
 
       
 
        Dim i As Integer 
        Dim z As Integer 
        z = Integer.Parse(TxtV.Text) - 1    ' Gets the amount of vendors as an 
array for the table creation 
        ReDim array2(z) 
        For i = 0 To z 
            array2(i) = array(i).ToString 
        Next 
        TextBox2.Clear() 
        For i = 0 To array2.Length - 1 
            TextBox2.Text = TextBox2.Text + array2(i) + " varchar(12),"  ' Creates 
the table with the amount of vendor columns specified by the user  
        Next 
        TextBox2.Text = Mid(TextBox2.Text, 1, TextBox2.TextLength - 1) 
        TextBox2.Text = "CREATE TABLE Group10\3(" + TextBox2.Text + ")"  ' Creates 
the table for the group 10  
 
        Dim strCreate As String = TextBox2.Text 
 
        Dim conDatabase As OleDbConnection = New 




           "Data Source=C:\\Users\\Kourosh\\Documents\\Auction.mdb;")               
'  Connection to the database 
 
 
        Dim cmdDatabase As OleDbCommand = New OleDbCommand(strCreate, conDatabase) 
 
        conDatabase.Open() 
 
        cmdDatabase.ExecuteNonQuery() 
        conDatabase.Close() 
 
 
        Dim SqlString As String = "Insert Into Group10\3 (A, B, C, D, E) Values 
(?,?,?,?,?) "      ' Sql command for inserting the values to the specified columns 
        Dim conn As OleDbConnection = New 
OleDbConnection("Provider=Microsoft.JET.OLEDB.4.0;" & _ 
           "Data Source=C:\\Users\\Kourosh\\Documents\\Auction.mdb;") 
        Dim T As Integer 
        Dim TL As Integer 
        T = 0 
        TL = TxtTL.Text 
        Dim AlphaMean As Decimal = (0.8) 
        Dim AlphaRange As Decimal = (0.2) 
        Dim V As Integer = TxtV.Text 
 
        Dim BetaMean As Decimal = (1.0) 
        Dim BetaRange As Decimal = (1.0) 
        Dim MeanSale As String = 100 
        Dim SlotOrder As Integer = 1 
        Dim Half As Decimal = 0.5 
 
        Dim RndNum As Random 
        Dim Alpha1A As New Decimal 
        Dim Beta1A As New Decimal 
        Dim AlphaA As New Decimal 
        Dim BetaA As New Decimal 
        Dim Alpha1B As New Decimal 
        Dim Beta1B As New Decimal 
        Dim AlphaB As New Decimal 
        Dim BetaB As New Decimal 
        Dim Alpha1C As New Decimal 
        Dim Beta1C As New Decimal 
        Dim AlphaC As New Decimal 
        Dim BetaC As New Decimal 
        Dim Alpha1D As New Decimal 
        Dim Beta1D As New Decimal 
        Dim AlphaD As New Decimal 
        Dim BetaD As New Decimal 
        Dim Alpha1E As New Decimal 
        Dim Beta1E As New Decimal 
        Dim AlphaE As New Decimal 
        Dim BetaE As New Decimal 
        Dim NumberA As New Decimal 
        Dim NumberB As New Decimal 
        Dim NumberC As New Decimal 
        Dim NumberD As New Decimal 
        Dim NumberE As New Decimal 





        Alpha1A = RndNum.Next((AlphaMean - (Half * AlphaRange)) * 100, (AlphaMean 
+ (Half * AlphaRange)) * 100)     ' Generates Random Number for Alpha A according 
to details 
        Beta1A = RndNum.Next((BetaMean - (Half * BetaRange)) * 100, (BetaMean + 
(Half * BetaRange)) * 100)           ' Generates Random Number for Beta A 
according to details 
 
        AlphaA = (Alpha1A / 100)  ' Conversion to decimal with 0.1 
        BetaA = (Beta1A / 100)   ' Conversion to decimal with 0.1 
 
        Alpha1B = RndNum.Next((AlphaMean - (Half * AlphaRange)) * 100, (AlphaMean 
+ (Half * AlphaRange)) * 100) 
        Beta1B = RndNum.Next((BetaMean - (Half * BetaRange)) * 100, (BetaMean + 
(Half * BetaRange)) * 100) 
 
        AlphaB = (Alpha1B / 100) 
        BetaB = (Beta1B / 100) 
 
        Alpha1C = RndNum.Next((AlphaMean - (Half * AlphaRange)) * 100, (AlphaMean 
+ (Half * AlphaRange)) * 100) 
        Beta1C = RndNum.Next((BetaMean - (Half * BetaRange)) * 100, (BetaMean + 
(Half * BetaRange)) * 100) 
 
        AlphaC = (Alpha1C / 100) 
        BetaC = (Beta1C / 100) 
 
        Alpha1D = RndNum.Next((AlphaMean - (Half * AlphaRange)) * 100, (AlphaMean 
+ (Half * AlphaRange)) * 100) 
        Beta1D = RndNum.Next((BetaMean - (Half * BetaRange)) * 100, (BetaMean + 
(Half * BetaRange)) * 100) 
 
        AlphaD = (Alpha1D / 100) 
        BetaD = (Beta1D / 100) 
 
        Alpha1E = RndNum.Next((AlphaMean - (Half * AlphaRange)) * 100, (AlphaMean 
+ (Half * AlphaRange)) * 100) 
        Beta1E = RndNum.Next((BetaMean - (Half * BetaRange)) * 100, (BetaMean + 
(Half * BetaRange)) * 100) 
 
        AlphaE = (Alpha1E / 100) 
        BetaE = (Beta1E / 100) 
 
 
        Do While T < TL  ' Loop till the time unit limit 
            T = T + 1 
 
            NumberA = BetaA * MeanSale * ((T ^ AlphaA) - ((T - 1) ^ AlphaA))  ' 
Produces Marginal Value for Vendor A  
            NumberB = BetaB * MeanSale * ((T ^ AlphaB) - ((T - 1) ^ AlphaB))   ' 
Produces Marginal Value for Vendor B  
            NumberC = BetaC * MeanSale * ((T ^ AlphaC) - ((T - 1) ^ AlphaC)) 
            NumberD = BetaD * MeanSale * ((T ^ AlphaD) - ((T - 1) ^ AlphaD)) 
            NumberE = BetaE * MeanSale * ((T ^ AlphaE) - ((T - 1) ^ AlphaE)) 
            NumberA = Decimal.Round(NumberA, 1)  ' Decimal Round to 0.1 
            NumberB = Decimal.Round(NumberB, 1) 
            NumberC = Decimal.Round(NumberC, 1) 




            NumberE = Decimal.Round(NumberE, 1) 
 
 
            Using cmd As New OleDbCommand(SqlString, conn)   ' Puts the marginal 
values inside the vendor columns  
                cmd.CommandType = CommandType.Text 
 
                cmd.Parameters.AddWithValue("A", NumberA) 
                cmd.Parameters.AddWithValue("B", NumberB) 
                cmd.Parameters.AddWithValue("C", NumberC) 
                cmd.Parameters.AddWithValue("D", NumberD) 
                cmd.Parameters.AddWithValue("E", NumberE) 
                conn.Open() 
                cmd.ExecuteNonQuery() 
                conn.Close() 
            End Using 





    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Button1_Click(sender As System.Object, e As System.EventArgs) 
Handles Button1.Click 
        Form2.Show() 
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